At 814 pages, it may be a bit heavy for summertime reading—and may take the entire summer to get through—but Mao, the Unknown Story, by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, seems to be a book that should be required reading for anyone interested in East Asia. Kevin Rafferty had this to say in his review for the Japan Times:

This is a nuclear weapon of a book. It devastates the reputation of Mao and most of his henchmen, and raises questions about the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party…

Other writers have already exposed the monstrous nature of Mao’s rule, but none managed such a frontal, comprehensive attack…

Chang and Halliday remorselessly show Mao as a ruthless power-monger and plotter. Their almost unrelieved catalog of cruel terrors that occurred while his colleagues stood by cowardly and cowed, makes you wonder if whether anyone could really be so evil.

Among the points made (in addition to the estimate of 70 million Chinese killed):

• The story behind the famous Long March is fictitious: Chiang Kai-Shek let Mao’s forces go.
• Mao and his comrades never actually marched. They were carried on litters (The authors talked to people who were on the march.)
• Mao never mounted serious efforts against the Japanese, preferring to spend his time eliminating his rivals.
• In Yenan in 1941, Mao funded his operations by converting 30,000 acres of land to opium production. (Some years ago, a bearded, sandal-wearing professor of Chinese history told me that Mao banned opium for everyone but himself. He smoked one bowl a day because it “helped him to think”. The professor thought this was amusing.)
• In power, Mao lived a life of utter luxury resembling that of an emperor. He had villas built throughout the country to his own specifications and used them once. Special fish were flown in live from 1,000 kilometers away so he could eat them with his special rice, water, and milk. (Sound like someone we know in Pyongyang?)
• Joseph Mobuto Sese Seko (former dictator of Zaire), describes how Mao used foreign aid to foment world revolution. At its peak, foreign aid accounted for 6.92% of overall Chinese expenditures.

In addition to Mobuto, the authors also talked to Mao’s daughter and grandson, veterans of the Long March, two U.S. presidents, Henry Kissinger, an Oscar-winning actor, several other heads of state, and the woman who washed Mao’s underwear.

Viewed from another perspective, this book may offer some clues for the reasons Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi doesn’t seem inclined to take seriously the Chinese complaints about his behavior and a few textbooks. The Chinese object to the content of Japanese history books, but none of this information will be found in any Chinese school text. The Chinese also complain about Yasukuni Shrine, yet as the book notes, “Today, Mao’s portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of the Chinese capital. The current Communist regime declares itself to be Mao’s heir and fiercely perpetuates the myth of Mao.”